



**Ohio Attorney General's Office
Bureau of Criminal Investigation
Investigative Report**



2026-1831

Officer Involved Critical Incident - 905 E. Warren St.,
Bucyrus, OH 44820, Crawford County

Investigative Activity: Tactical Team Commander Statement Review
Involves: Sergeant Jered Kingsborough
Activity Date: 07/02/2026
Activity Location: BCI – Bowling Green
Authoring Agent: SA David Hammond #120

Narrative:

On July 02, 2026, Special Agent David Hammond (SA Hammond) received an email from Fraternal Order of Police Union Attorney Jessica Franken (Atty. Franken). The email contained a written statement as an attachment from Sergeant Jered Kingsborough (Sgt. Kingsborough) of the Mansfield Police Department (MPD). Sgt. Kingsborough was the Team Commander of the ASORT Tactical Team during the May 11, 2026, Officer Involved Critical Incident that took place at 905 E. Warren St. in Bucyrus, Ohio. An invitation to an in-person interview with investigators was declined through his attorney in a June 18, 2026, email from Atty. Franken.

On July 02, 2026, SA Hammond reviewed the statement from Sgt. Kingsborough. The following portions of Sgt. Kingsborough's statements were deemed notable in this investigation. Some of the written statements have been compressed for ease of reading. Sgt. Kingsborough's statement was attached to this report, in its entirety.

The heading of the document read:

Statement of Sergeant Jered Kingsborough, Mansfield Police Department and ASORT Commander Regarding Incident on May 11, 2026.

One (written one in statement) the day in question, I would report to the incident commander which was Craig Moser. My ASORT team is governed by Richland County Chiefs of Police Association, and I report to the board that is made up of the Chiefs of Police Departments in Richland County.

My current assignment with the Mansfield Police Department is the Sergeant of Major Crimes in the Detective Bureau.

As a law enforcement officer, I have never received any discipline related to use of force. I have never been the subject of any internal affairs investigation related to use of force. In my law enforcement career, I have had one prior

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incident where lethal force was applied in [REDACTED]. The incident was investigated by BCI and cleared through the Grand Jury process in Richland County Court of Common Pleas.

The last ASORT training I completed was April 15-16, 2026, over live fire sniper-initiated entries.

I arrived on scene in my work vehicle, an unmarked 2023, silver Chevy Malibu. I was not wearing BWC (body worn camera) nor any recording device.

At approximately 0115 hours, I was contacted via phone by the Mansfield Police Dispatch Center who advised me that Crawford SRT was requesting the activation of ASORT to assist with the incident in their jurisdiction. I requested that UAS, HNT and MOC respond as well. I was provided Lt. Craig Moser's contact information as the requestor of ASORT.

At 0128 hours, an Everbridge activation was broadcasted to operators and supplemental team members regarding the call-out. Seventeen operators and two tactical medics were available for this call-out.

I spoke with Lt. Moser via public service while enroute to the incident location. Lt. Moser advised regarding the domestic violence and that their negotiators had been in contact with the suspect, Paul Desmarais, over the phone. Lt. Moser stated that Paul was giving radical thoughts, possessed high powered rifles/munitions, and possible explosives. Lt. Moser stated that Paul was believed to have a gas mask and bulletproof vest in his possession. Paul was believed to suffer from schizophrenia and possibly self-medicated with alcohol and methamphetamine per Lt. Moser.

ASORT departed for 905 E. Warren Rd. at approximately 0210 hours and arrived at 0238 hours. A command post was established to control information and personnel flow. Upon speaking with Lt. Moser, he informed me that he would resume role of Incident Command through the event and requested ASORT take over tactical operations.

After reviewing all the information related to the case, the following tactical plan was established. Bearcats 182 and [REDACTED] would relieve Crawford County SRT of their containment positions. Bearcat 182 would take a containment position on the 3-side, and [REDACTED] would hold containment on the 1-side. Once both teams are set, HNT will continue to attempt contact with Paul via cell phone and PA system. Both containment teams will assess the structure and construct a gas munition plan.

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At 0314 hours, ASORT relieved containment. HNT was unable to make contact and prepared for gas options to include launchables to the second story 1-4 sides. Gas was deployed with no response from suspect. I made the decision to deploy gas, in an effort to get the suspect to surrender and exit the house safely.

At approximately 0325 hours, Sgt. Williams advised of a camera affixed to the garage on the 3-side. Sgt. Williams requests permission to disable the camera. I gave Sgt. Williams permission to disable the camera.

At approximately 0330 hours, I issue the second order to launch gas to all areas of the residence. Gas was deployed, and again there was no response from the suspect.

At approximately 0356 hours, shots were fired from inside the residence out of the 3 side. Operators reported that the firearm sounded like a rifle with a three-round burst.

At approximately 0412 hours, 182 Containment Team requested to break the light on the exterior building illuminating their area of operation for concealment. I granted the request.

At approximately 0427 hours, the interior drone located a room in the upstairs portion of the residence that had a ballistic vest, rifle parts are observed on the bed in the room, and a rifle was observed in a closet.

At approximately 0446 hours, I contacted Erik Lofland with OSP SRT. I requested information on their Rook and requested they send a team to assist with Rook. Having been fired at once already, our main objective was to get visual and confirmed communication with the suspect.

At approximately 0559 (hours), ASORT pulled the electrical meter. The decision to pull the gas meter was a tactic used for anxiety manipulation to the suspect and make the structure safer if the need to dismantle the house became necessary.

I requested an arrest warrant be filed for the suspect. Bucyrus obtained an arrest warrant for Domestic Violence.

At approximately 0630 (hours) SRT (Ohio State Highway Patrol - OSHP) arrives on the scene with the Rook. Then, at 0708 (hours), the third deployment of gas was introduced through the 3-side with the Rook and its gas insertion tool. This was again in attempt to get the suspect to surrender and exit the house. HNT

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was continuing attempts to make contact with the suspect. The suspect seemed unaffected by the deployment of gas and did not surrender.

At approximately 0808 (hours), the fourth deployment of gas was introduced into the residence via the Rook gas insertion tool on the 3-side. Flashbangs and sirens were also used on the 1-side as diversion in attempt to distract the suspect away from the area officers would be deploying the gas. These tactics had no apparent effects on suspect, as he still did not surrender.

At approximately 0840 (hours) - fifth deployment of gas - Rook - 1-side. No apparent effects on suspect. He still did not surrender.

At approximately 0900 (hours) - Crawford SRT - shut gas off to the residence at the curb. The decision to shut off gas is a standard practice/tactic to make the house safer when dismantling.

At approximately 0950 (hours), the Rook began dismantling 3-side, second story. The objective was to get a visual on the suspect after deployment of gas on five separate occasions and shots fired from the residence. Additionally, we were still seeking confirmed communication with the suspect.

Operators on 3-side communicate to the command post that they can hear yelling from the suspect. They are unable to determine what suspect is saying. At approximately 0958 (hours) information is given to CP stating the male is willing to exit but he is seated on a grenade and states he does not have his phone with him. Ashland County Bomb Squad was contacted.

At approximately 1027 (hours) the interior drone was requested to fly into the structure to determine location of suspect within the structure. Lt. Rhinehart was operating. The suspect was located and video was forwarded to CP. In reviewing the footage, I observed the suspect in what appeared to be an ambush position in a 3-side, upstairs room. The suspect was in a room-corner with what appeared to be a bunk bed frame on the other side of him. He was wearing a gas mask around his neck with a long rifle by his side. I then ordered additional gas deployment directed at the room. The suspect puts on his gas mask and gas is ineffective.

At approximately 1030 (hours), Lofland, Moser, Chief Bammann and I conference in a secure, sound-controlled area of the command post. All leaders agree that the suspect is not coming out. At this point, gas had been deployed on six separate occasions, and the suspect had shot at law enforcement twice. We used the rook, and drones that showed us the suspect was wearing a gas

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mask rendering any gas deployment ineffective. Our hostage negotiators had been attempting to contact the suspect approximately every five minutes via phone, or audible hail. There were 80 separate attempts by ASORT negotiators to contact Paul.

Due to the totality of circumstances including Paul's defensive position with armor, ballistics and rifle capabilities, as well as his repeated shots at officers, a sniper-initiated action was deemed the safest course of resolution to officers and civilians. Due to Paul's placement in the structure, location of shots that came from the house, and officer's positioning to control the public, all officers on scene on the 3-side were in imminent risk of serious harm or death if Paul began shooting again.

We were making every attempt to use less than lethal force to resolve the incident but prepared to move forward if the suspect did not surrender.

HNT Swisher attempted to get the suspect to surrender and exit the residence. The suspect told HNT Swisher that he was sitting on a live grenade with the pin pulled and was not leaving. At this point, it became clear there was a real and continued threat to the lives of all law enforcement officers and the public. It was also clear that despite countless attempts to get the suspect to surrender with less than lethal force, he was not going to surrender.

I ordered the use of lethal force because I do not believe that there was any less lethal force that could have been used that would have been effective in stopping the immediate and direct threat that the suspect posed to others by his actions in firing his weapon multiple times at law enforcement, and the threat of a live grenade. My actions in deploying the sniper were consistent with my training and expertise as a law enforcement officer.

At this time the suspect still will not exit and continued to state that he is seated on a grenade and cannot exit. At approximately 1111 (hours), I give [REDACTED] command to shoot suspect on his ready. One round was fired. Ashland County Bomb Squad was then used to clear residence.

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References:

Email from J. Franken FOP on 06.18.26 Declining Interviews

Attachments:

1. Written Statements from Officers – Sgt. Kingsborough

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Statement of Sergeant Jered Kingsborough,
Mansfield Police Department and ASORT Commander
Regarding Incident on May 11, 2026

I. Background:

Badge #252

I began my full time employment with the Mansfield Police Department on November 26, 2007. Prior to MPD, I worked at the Green Springs Police Department for less than a year before being hired at MPD. I attended Terra State Community College Police Academy and graduated in 2007.

I completed my bachelor's degree at the University of Toledo graduating in 2005. I do not have any prior military experience.

I do not wear prescription eyeglasses, contacts, or hearing aids. I am under no physical disability. I take no prescription medications. I was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, prescription or otherwise, on the date of the incident.

My current supervisor day to day is Lieutenant Rob Skropits. One the day in question, I would report to the incident commander which was Craig Moser. My ASORT team is governed by Richland Couty Chiefs of Police Association, and I report to the board that is made up of the Chiefs of the Police Departments in Richland County.

My regularly assigned work days and hours are as follows:

[REDACTED] My days off are [REDACTED] My current assignment with the Mansfield Police Department is the Sergeant of Major Crimes in the Detective Bureau.

As a law enforcement officer, I have never received any discipline related to use of force. I have never been the subject of any Internal Affairs investigation related to use of force. In my law enforcement career, I have had one prior incident where lethal force was applied in [REDACTED]. The incident was investigated by BCI and cleared through the Grand Jury process in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.

There have been some instances where I have used less than lethal force, all such instances were reviewed and cleared without issue.

I am familiar with the Mansfield Police Department's Use of Force Policies. I am up to date on department training. Most recently I attended officer involved shooting training the week prior to this incident at the Columbus Police Academy. The last ASORT training I completed was April 15 – 16, 2026, over live fire sniper-initiated entries.

I had not worked any overtime in the 48 hours leading up to the incident. I was not working regular shift hours when the incident occurred. Dispatch called me at home at 1:15AM on May 11, 2026. I had gotten 3 hours of sleep given the time of the call out. I had been well rested prior to that.

I arrived on scene in my work vehicle, an unmarked 2023 silver Chevy Malibu, issued to me by the Mansfield Police Department. This vehicle does not have a dash cam or recording system. I was wearing ASORT BDU bottoms, and a T-shirt with ASORT designation on it. I had on my person my department issued radio and department issued firearm; a Sig P320, 9mm. I was not wearing BWC nor any recording device.

II. Incident Narrative:

At approximately 0115 hours I was contacted via phone by the Mansfield Police Dispatch Center who advised me that Crawford SRT was requesting the activation of ASORT to assist with the

incident in their jurisdiction. The radio room informed me that Chief Bammann had already approved said call-out. I requested that UAS, HNT and the MOC respond as well. I was provided Lt. Craig Moser's contact information as the requestor of ASORT.

At 0128 hours an Everbridge activation was broadcasted to operators and supplemental team members regarding the call-out. Seventeen operators and 2 tactical medics were available for this call-out.

I spoke with Lt. Moser via public service while enroute to the incident location. Lt. Moser advised regarding the domestic violence and that their negotiators had been in contact with the suspect, Paul Desmarais, over the phone. Lt. Moser stated that Paul was giving radical thoughts, possessed high powered rifles/munitions, and possible explosives. Lt. Moser stated that Paul was believed to have a gas mask and bulletproof vest in his possession. Paul was believed to suffer from schizophrenia and possibly self-medicated with alcohol and methamphetamine per Lt. Moser.

ASORT reported to MPD to prepare all operational gear and equipment. ASORT departed for 905 E Warren Rd. at approximately 0210 hours and arrived at 0238 hours. A command post was established to control information and personnel flow. Upon speaking with Lt. Moser, he informed me that he would resume role of Incident Command through the event and requested ASORT take over tactical operations. I was advised that a search warrant for the residence had been secured prior to ASORT's arrival on scene. Lt. Moser stated that all neighboring houses had been contacted and afforded the opportunity to leave the area with Police assistance. No residents chose to leave.

Weather conditions on the day of the mission were calm and mostly cloudy. Temperature was approximately 37 degrees at 0100 hours and 61 degrees around 1200 hours. Winds was 2-9 mph from the north.

The property of 905 E Warren St. was known to be a rental property being occupied by Paul and his family. Members of Paul's family were removed from the location during the initial Police response to the domestic violence. 905 was a two-story, single-family dwelling with a basement. The property had a detached garage on the 3-side of the property and a fence surrounding the back yard. Vehicle's belonging to Paul's employer and a utility trailer were parked in front of the residence, on the street.

After reviewing all the information related to the case the following tactical plan was established. Bearcats 182 and [REDACTED] would relieve Crawford County SRT of their containment positions. Bearcat 182 would take a containment position on the 3-side and [REDACTED] would hold containment of the 1-side. Once both teams are set, HNT will continue to attempt contact with Paul via cell phone and PA system. Both containment teams will assess the structure and construct a gas munition plan.

At 0314 hours ASORT relieved containment. HNT was unable to make contact and prepared for gas options to include launchable to the second story 1-4 sides. I then gave the order to deploy gas to second story, 1-4 sides. Gas was deployed with no response from suspect. I made the decision to deploy gas in an effort to get the suspect to surrender and exit the house safely.

At approximately 0325, Sgt. Williams advises of a camera affixed to the garage on the 3-side. Sgt. Williams requests permission to disable the camera. Due to any tactical advantage the suspect might have if he was viewing said camera, I gave Sgt. Williams permission to disable the camera. Sgt. Williams' team uses a ladder to knock down the camera.

At approximately 0330 hours I issued the second order to launch gas to all areas of the residence, 1-4 sides. Gas was deployed, and again there was no response from suspect. Shortly thereafter at approximately 0345 hours, I issued the order to break the 2-side downstairs window for interior drone deployment. I issued this order because gas had been deployed twice now with no response from the suspect and we wanted to see if we could get a visual on the suspect. The window was broken, and drone entered inside the residence.

At approximately 0356 hours, shots were fired from inside the residence out of the 3 side. Operators reported that the firearm sounded like a rifle with a three-round burst. There were no injuries to officers. The drone team able to determine that there was a male in the upstairs of residence. The suspect then kicks bedroom door shut.

At approximately 0412 hours 182 Containment team requested to break the lights on exterior building illuminating their area of operation for concealment. I granted the request, and the team disables lights affixed to exterior building. I later learned that the team attempted first to hit the lights but they did not break. A team member then shot out the lights. Subsequently, the residence rear porch light came on.

At approximately 0427 hours the interior drone located a room in the upstairs portion of the residence that had a ballistic vest, rifle parts are observed on the bed in that room, and a rifle was observed in a closet.

At Approximately 0446 I contacted Erik Lofland with OSP SRT. I requested information on their Rook and requested they send a team to assist with Rook. Lofland then responded with three additional operators. The intent was to begin to dismantle residence for better communication port. At this point, we still did not have a visual of the suspect as the interior drone could not access the portion of the residence where we believed the suspect to be located. Having been fired at once already, our main objective was to get visual and confirmed communication with the suspect.

At approximately 0559 ASORT pulled the electric meter from the house removing power. The decision to pull the gas meter was a tactic used for anxiety manipulation to the suspect and make the structure safer if the need to dismantle the house became necessary. Shortly after Crawford Co. SRT moved to relieve the ASORT team in [REDACTED] side. I requested an arrest warrant be filed for the suspect. Moser agreed and Bucyrus obtained an arrest warrant for Domestic Violence.

At approximately 0630 SRT arrives on scene with Rook. Then, at approximately 0708, the third deployment of gas was introduced through the 3-side using the Rook and its gas insertion tool. This was again in attempt to get the suspect to surrender and exit the house. At this point, gas had been deployed twice previously, a drone had attempted to get a visual on the suspect without success, and HNT was continuing attempts to make contact with the suspect. Following the deployment of gas by the rook, shots fired from inside the residence out of the 3-side. The suspect seemed unaffected by the deployment of gas and did not surrender.

At approximately 0808 the fourth deployment of gas was introduced into the residence via the Rook gas insertion tool on the 3-side. Flashbangs and sirens were also used on the 1-side as diversion in attempt to distract the suspect away from the area officers would be deploying the gas. These tactics had no apparent effects on suspect, as he still did not surrender.

At approximately 0840 the fifth deployment of gas was introduced into the residence via the Rook gas insertion tool on the 1-side. Flash bangs and sirens are again used on the 3-side as diversion. These tactics still had no apparent effects on suspect, as he still did not surrender.

At approximately 0900, Crawford SRT with assistance from the gas company, shut gas off to the residence at the curb. The decision to shut off gas is a standard practice/tactic to make the house safer when dismantling. Then at approximately 0950, [REDACTED] began to dismantle 1-side using hydraulic ram through the wall. Simultaneously the Rook began dismantling 3-side, second story. The objective was to get a visual on the suspect after deployment of gas on five (5) separate occasions and shots fired from inside the residence. Additionally, we were still seeking confirmed communication with the suspect.

Operators on 3-side communicate to the command post that they can hear yelling from the suspect. They are unable to determine what suspect is saying. At approximately 0958 information

is given to CP stating the male is willing to exit but he is seated on a grenade and states he does not have his phone with him. I consulted with Lt. Moser regarding the information about the grenade and Ashland County Bomb Squad was contacted referencing the grenade and requested a response.

At approximately 1027 the interior drone was requested to fly into structure to determine location of suspect within the structure. Lt. Rhinehart was operating. The request was granted. The suspect was located and video was forwarded to CP. In reviewing the footage I observed the suspect in what appeared to be an ambush position in a 3-side, upstairs room. The suspect was in a room corner with what appeared to be a bunk bed frame on the other side of him. He was wearing a gas mask around his neck with a long rifle by his side. I then ordered additional gas deployment directed at that room. The suspect puts on his gas mask and gas is ineffective.

At approximately 1030 Lofland, Moser, Chief Bammann and I conference in a secure, sound-controlled area of the Command Post. All leaders agree that suspect is not coming out. At this point, gas had been deployed on six (6) separate occasions and the suspect had shot at law enforcement twice. We used the rook, and drones that showed us the suspect was wearing a gas mask rendering any gas deployment ineffective. Our hostage negotiators had been attempting to contact the suspect approximately every five minutes via phone, or audible hail, since the team arrived on scene to no avail. There were approximately 80 separate attempts by ASORT negotiators to contact Paul.

Due to the totality of circumstances including Paul's defense position with armor, ballistics and rifle capabilities, as well as his repeated shots at officer's, a sniper-initiated action was deemed the safest course of resolution to officers and civilians. Due to Paul's placement in the structure, location of shots that came from the house, and officer's positioning to control harm the public, all officers on scene on the 3-side were in imminent risk of serious physical harm or death if Paul began shooting again.

I Consult with Sgt. Stantz, Dep. Ivy, and Sgt. Davis in reference to the Rook shield platform and usage. Operators contacted OSP and provided cover for Rook [REDACTED] was briefed on sniper-initiated resolution. HNT Swisher was briefed on making verbal contact with suspect and conducting a final attempt at a peaceful exit. We were making every attempt to use less than lethal force to resolve the incident but prepared to move forward if the suspect did not surrender.

HNT Swisher attempted to get the suspect to surrender and exit the residence. The suspect told HNT Swisher that he was sitting on a live grenade with the pin pulled and was not leaving. At this point, it became clear there was a real and continued threat to the lives of all law enforcement officers and the public in the area. It was also clear that despite countless attempts to get the suspect to surrender with less than lethal force, he was not going to surrender.


I ordered the use of lethal force because I do not believe that there was any less lethal force that could have been used that would have been effective in stopping the immediate and direct threat that the suspect posed to others by his actions in firing his weapon multiple times at law enforcement, and the threat of a live grenade. My actions in deploying the sniper were consistent with my training and experience as a law enforcement officer.

At approximately 1103 the rook platform with operators was in place. [REDACTED] was in place and had clear sight picture of suspect on the 3-side. At this time the suspect still will not exit and continued to state that he is seated on a grenade and cannot exit.

At approximately 1111, I give [REDACTED] command to shoot suspect on his ready. One round was fired, and the suspect was down. ASORT held security on residence until they were relieved. Ashland County Bomb Squad was then used to clear residence. ASORT then secured from the scene and turned over to OSP SRT and Ashland County Bomb Squad.

This statement is made from the best of my recollection as to the incident that occurred on May 11, 2026.

Respectfully Submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sgt. J. Kingsborough", is written over a horizontal line. To the right of the signature, the number "752" is handwritten.

Sergeant Jered Kingsborough
Mansfield PD/ASORT Commander

7-2-26
Date