

October 4, 2023

The Honorable James R. Flaiz
Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney
231 Main Street, 3rd Floor
Chardon, Ohio 44024

SYLLABUS:

2023-009

1. The duties of the county records commission cannot be delegated to the board of county commissioners because they require the exercise of discretionary judgment, and there is no statutory authorization to do so.
2. The duties of the county microfilming board cannot be delegated to the board of county commissioners because they require the exercise of discretionary judgment, and there is no statutory authorization to do so.
3. The duties of the county recorder, acting as chief administrator of the county microfilming board, cannot be delegated by either the county recorder or the county microfilming board to the board of county commissioners because they require the exercise of discretionary judgment, and there is no statutory authorization for either entity to do so.

4. Because the duties of the county records commission and the county microfilming board cannot be delegated, they may be transferred only pursuant to the procedure outlined in R.C. 307.847.
5. There is no explicit or implicit authority in the Revised Code for the county microfilming board to contract for services with its own county's board of county commissioners; instead, the county microfilming board is statutorily required to provide these services to the board of county commissioners.



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October 4, 2023

OPINION NO. 2023-009

The Honorable James R. Flaiz
Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney
231 Main Street, 3rd Floor
Chardon, Ohio 44024

Dear Prosecutor Flaiz:

You have requested an opinion regarding the delegation and transfer of duties vested by statute in specific public offices. I have framed your questions as follows:

1. Can the county records commission delegate its statutory duties or authority to the board of county commissioners?
2. Can the county microfilming board delegate its statutory duties or authority to the board of county commissioners?
3. Can the county microfilming board, or the county recorder, delegate the statutory duties or authority assigned to the county recorder, acting as the board's chief administrator, to the board of county commissioners?

4. Is the process allowing the board of county commissioners to expand the duties of the automatic data processing board, set out by R.C. 307.847, the only mechanism by which the duties of the county records commission and county microfilming board be transferred?
5. Does R.C. 307.806 permit the county microfilming board to contract to provide services with its own board of county commissioners?

I

A

You have indicated that an agreement executed in 2008 purports to authorize the Geauga County board of county commissioners to perform duties statutorily vested in the county's records commission and microfilming board.

The question has arisen whether this agreement is a permissible delegation of duties. While I cannot opine on the validity of the agreement, I can advise regarding the duties and authority that the board of county commissioners, county records commission (records commission), county microfilming board (microfilming board), and county recorder (recorder) have under R.C. Chapters 149 and 307. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-087,

at 2-342 (the Attorney General is “without authority to render an opinion interpreting a particular agreement or contract”).

For clarity, I have reorganized and combined some of your questions to analyze similar topics together.

B

The board of county commissioners, records commission, microfilming board, and recorder are all creatures of statute established by R.C. 305.01, R.C. 149.38, R.C. 307.80, and R.C. 317.01, respectively. As such, these entities have “only those powers and duties which are set forth by statute or are reasonably implied to effectuate those powers statutorily granted.” 1989 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 89-051, at 2-216; *State ex rel. A. Bentley & Sons Co. v. Pierce*, 96 Ohio St. 44, 47, 117 N.E. 6 (1917); *Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Comm.*, 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E.2d 480, ¶13. They are “required to act ‘in strict conformity’ with their statutory powers,” and any action taken “that exceed their statutory powers have no legal effect.” 2017 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2017-044, Slip Op. at 7; 2-426, citing *Wright v. Bayowski*, 78 Ohio Law Abs. 321, 152 N.E.2d 441 (7th Dist.1957), syllabus at paragraph one.

II

The first three questions relate to the authority of a public office or officer to delegate its statutory duties.

“Where the proper execution of a public office requires that the officer exercise his own judgment or discretion, the presumption is that the particular officer was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment or discretion.” 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 77-064, at 2-232. Absent an express grant of authority, a public office or officer may not delegate duties requiring the exercise of discretion. *See, e.g.*, 1985 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 85-008, at 2-32 (duties requiring the exercise of discretion cannot be contracted away). If, however, the statutory duty in question is ministerial, the duty can be delegated. 1979 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 79-067, at 2-223; *see* 2023 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2023-007, Slip Op. at 15-16 (duties can be delegated to a subordinate); R.C. 3.06(A); R.C. 9.35(B) (ability for public official to contract for the performance of “mechanical, clerical, or record-keeping”—*ministerial*—duties).

In sum: if a duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment and there is no statutory authorization to delegate such duty, the duty cannot be delegated. *E.g.*, 2008 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2008-038, at 2-388. To answer the questions presented, the first consideration is whether the statutory duties of each public office or officer are ministerial or require the exercise of judgment

and discretion. *See State ex rel. Hunt v. Hildebrant*, 93 Ohio St. 1, 11-12, 112 N.E. 138 (1915) (if the statutes are silent on the method by which the duties are to be performed, “it necessarily follows that [the entity] required to perform this duty has implied authority to determine, in the exercise of a fair and impartial official discretion, the manner and method of doing the thing commanded”). The second consideration is whether the public office or officer has statutory authority to delegate its duties—be it ministerial or discretionary—to another entity, including to the board of county commissioners.

A

You first ask whether the records commission may delegate its duties or authority to the board of county commissioners. It may not.

The records commission is composed “of a member of the board of county commissioners as chairperson, the prosecuting attorney, the auditor, the recorder, and the clerk of the court of common pleas.” R.C. 149.38(A). Under “the Ohio Public Records Act, public offices are obligated to make public records available in response to a request from any person” and they “are strictly prohibited from destroying or disposing of any of their records, unless permitted by law, *or under the rules adopted by the governing records commission.*” (Emphasis added.) *Rhodes v. City of New Philadelphia*,

129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 782, ¶14; R.C. 149.351(A); 2013 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2013-006, at 2-64. And so, the records commission is solely responsible for making “rules for retention and disposal of records of the county.” R.C. 149.38(B)(1); *see, e.g.*, 1960 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 1348, p. 335, at 337; 1988 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 88-083, at 2-403.

Pursuant to R.C. 149.38(B)(1), each county office submits its “applications for one-time disposal of obsolete records and schedules of records retention and disposition” to the records commission for review and approval. *See* R.C. 149.351(A) (public offices are required to comply with records commission rules for destruction of records). “[F]or good cause shown,” the records commission may revise a previously approved schedule. R.C. 149.38(B)(1). After the records commission approves a county office’s records retention schedule or one-time disposal application, the approved item is sent to the Ohio history connection and the Ohio auditor of state for additional review and approval; but, these entities do not review the rules created by the records commission. R.C. 149.38(C)(1)-(3); 2007 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2007-042, at 2-422, fn. 10; *accord* 1997 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-011, at 2-64 to 2-65, fn. 3.

Both rulemaking and approving submitted items require the exercise of discretion. *See, e.g.*, 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 82-048, at 2-138 (“As rulemaking requires that the members of Board of Building Standards

exercise judgment and discretion, they are prohibited from delegating this power absent statutory authority to the contrary”); *FRC of Kamms Corner, Inc. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals*, 14 Ohio App.3d 372, 375, 471 N.E.2d 845 (8th Dist.1984) (“An administrative agency has broad discretion in its decision-making”); 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 90-055, at 2-230 (“Approve’ ... carries with it the concept of examining and exercising discretion”). And there is nothing in R.C. 149.38 that permits the records commission to delegate its duties to any other entity. Accordingly, the records commission does not have the authority to delegate its duties to the board of county commissioners. *See generally* 2019 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2019-001, Slip Op. at 2; 2-2 to 2-3.

I note here that R.C. 149.36 states “[t]he provisions of [R.C. 149.31-.42], inclusive, shall not impair or restrict the authority given by other statutes over the creation of records, systems, forms, procedures or the control over purchases of equipment by public offices.” This does not modify the analysis above, since the board of county commissioners has no statutory authority related to the duties performed by the records commission.

B

Next, you ask whether the microfilming board's duties or authority may be delegated to the board of county commissioners. They may not.

The language in R.C. 307.80 is permissive, stating that the board of county commissioners "may" establish a microfilming board via resolution. *State ex rel. Niles v. Bernard*, 53 Ohio St.2d 31, 34, 372 N.E.2d 339, 341 (1978) ("usage of the term 'may' is generally construed to render optional, permissive, or discretionary the provision in which it is embodied"); *accord* 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-034, at 2-134. If established, its membership must include the county treasurer, the county auditor, the clerk of the court of common pleas, a member of the board of county commissioners, and the recorder, or representatives of each of these offices. R.C. 307.80. When a microfilming board is in place, all county offices are prohibited from independently acquiring or contracting for microfilming equipment or services unless the microfilming board "determines such action is desirable" and expressly approves it in writing. R.C. 307.802; R.C. 307.80. If no microfilming board is established by the board of county commissioners, "those county officers who desire such services are free to secure them elsewhere." *Campanella v. Cuyahoga County*, 57 Ohio Misc. 20, 23, 387 N.E.2d at 256-57 (C.P.1977); R.C. 9.35; R.C. 9.01.

The microfilming board is responsible for purchasing, leasing, operating, and contracting for the use of microfilming or image processing equipment, software, or services for the county, and may contract with other legislative authorities to provide these services. R.C. 307.80; R.C. 307.802; R.C. 307.806. Purchases are made from county “funds budgeted and appropriated by the board of county commissioners for such purposes,” and the microfilming board is authorized to charge county offices for services provided. R.C. 307.803; R.C. 307.806. The microfilming board may also adopt rules deemed necessary for its operation. R.C. 307.801.

The microfilming board’s duties—entering contracts, making purchases, and promulgating rules—require the exercise of judgment and discretion. And because there is no express statutory authority allowing delegation to a board of county commissioners, the duties may not be delegated. 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 77-064, at 2-232; 2004 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2004-031, at 2-282; 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 82-048, at 2-138. True, the microfilming board consists of five specifically identified officials or their “representative[s].” R.C. 307.80. But the option to appoint a representative allows, at most, delegation of each *board member’s* duties to a representative of his office—it does not permit delegation of *the board’s* powers to a separate entity.

C

Your final delegation question asks whether the recorder or the microfilming board can delegate the recorder's duties or authority as chief administrator of the microfilming board to the board of county commissioners. For the reasons that follow, I find that neither entity may do so.

"The county recorder *shall* be the chief administrator of the county microfilming board." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 307.804. The use of "shall" means that the recorder is *required* to serve as the chief administrator of the microfilming board. See *Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist.*, 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971), syllabus at paragraph one; 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-031, at 2-117, quoting *State ex rel. John Tague Post v. Klinger*, 114 Ohio St. 212, 214, 151 N.E. 47, 48 (1926). The mandatory language in R.C. 307.804 affords no discretion or statutory authorization for either the recorder or the microfilming board to assign the role of chief administrator, or delegate the position's duties, to any other person or entity, including the board of county commissioners.

Although this statute also authorizes the recorder, in the role of chief administrator, to hire a deputy to work under the recorder's direction, this does not constitute permission for the recorder to transfer or delegate the recorder's ultimate responsibility to administer the

microfilming board. R.C. 307.804; *see generally* 2016 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2016-017, Slip Op. at 18-19; 2-180 to 2-181; *see also* R.C. 3.06(A). Nor does R.C. 307.80, which authorizes the elected officials on the microfilming board to appoint representatives only to serve generally in their stead on the board, confer any additional authority to either the recorder or the microfilming board to reassign the recorder’s statutory duties as the chief administrator to another. *See, e.g.*, 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 90-034, syllabus at paragraph one (relating to the duty the county auditor has to supervise a county’s automatic data processing board). Also consider that the microfilming board is statutorily prohibited from adopting any rule that “shall derogate the authority or responsibility of any elected official,” which would be the inevitable effect of delegating the recorder’s statutorily assigned duties as chief administrator to another person or entity. R.C. 307.801; *see The American Heritage Dictionary* 489 (5th Ed.2016) (“derogate” means “[t]o take away; detract”).

Additionally, the duties of the chief administrator—employing and fixing the compensation for a staff, as necessary; adopting rules to manage the microfilming center, if one is established; and submitting estimates of the microfilming center’s revenue and expenditures to the board of county commissioners pursuant to the tax budget procedure as outlined in R.C. 5705.28(C)(1)—require the exercise of discretion. From that, and from the lack of statutory authorization

to delegate, it follows that these powers cannot be delegated. 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 77-064, at 2-232; R.C. 307.804; R.C. 307.802; R.C. 307.805; *see* R.C. 317.321(F); R.C. 9.35; *see also* 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 82-048, at 2-138; 1997 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-043, at 2-268; 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 90-034, at 2-136 to 2-137.

III

Having established that neither the records commission nor the microfilming board has authority to delegate its respective duties or those of the recorder to any other entity, and that the board of county commissioners cannot undertake those duties, I will address whether R.C. 307.847 is the only way by which the duties of the records commission and the microfilming board may be transferred. I conclude that it is.

“It is one of the well recognized [sic] canons of statutory construction that when a statute directs a thing may be done by a specified means or in a particular manner it may not be done by other means or in a different manner.” *Akron Transp. Co. v. Glander*, 155 Ohio St. 471, 480, 99 N.E.2d 493 (1951), quoting *Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City*, 89 Utah 546, 551, 58 P.2d 1 (1936); *accord* 1995 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 95-028, at 2-143 (“The fact that there is a statutory procedure in place ... suggests that the General Assembly intends that scheme to be the only manner in which” it may be done).

Enacted in 2011, R.C. 307.847 authorizes the board of county commissioners to require the county automatic data processing board (ADP), if one is established by the board of county commissioners under R.C. 307.84, “to coordinate the management of information resources of the county, the records and information management operations of all county offices, and the various records and information technologies acquired and operated by county offices” in lieu of both a records commission and a microfilming board. R.C. 307.847(A); 2011 Am. Sub. H.B. 153, pp. 440-443. On the effective dates of the board of county commissioners’ resolution for this transfer of duties and responsibilities, the records commission and the microfilming board both cease to exist. R.C. 307.847(A). And at that time, the ADP exercises all of the “powers, duties, and functions” of the former records commission and microfilming board and assumes their contractual obligations, assets and liabilities, and any other ongoing business. R.C. 307.847(A)-(C).

The language of R.C. 307.847 is clear and unambiguous: the board of county commissioners is empowered only to reassign the powers, duties, and functions of the records commission and the microfilming board to the ADP in the manner provided; the board of county commissioners may not *itself* perform the duties of the records commission or the microfilming board, nor may it assign those duties to any other entity. R.C. 307.847;

Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441, syllabus at paragraph three (“it is the duty of this court to give effect to the words used, not to delete words used or insert words not used”). My conclusion is supported by the decision in *Campanella v. Cuyahoga Cty.*, 57 Ohio Misc. 20, 387 N.E.2d 254 (C.P. 1977), in which the court held that the board of county commissioners’ authority to establish and terminate an ADP did not give it the authority to terminate the ADP and then provide the same services that the ADP provides to other county offices through any other centralized means. 1977 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 77-030, at 2-110.

In your request, you note that the structure of the microfilming board’s governing statutes parallels that of the ADP statutes, and you question whether terminating the microfilming board—without creating an ADP—has the same effect as the court noted in *Campanella*. The answer is “yes”: the board of county commissioners cannot terminate the microfilming board and then perform the microfilming board’s duties itself or establish another county entity to do so. See R.C. 307.80. And also like the ADP, if the board of county commissioners does not establish the microfilming board to perform its statutory duties, the board of county commissioners is “without authority to provide them at all” and the county offices are permitted to obtain the services themselves. *Campanella* at 23;

accord 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 90-057, at 2-243 to 2-244, fn. 3, citing R.C. 9.01; *see also* R.C. 9.35; R.C. 307.84.

On the other hand, the framework for the records commission is *not* like that of either the ADP or the microfilming board: the records commission is created by statutory mandate and not at the discretion of the board of county commissioners. R.C. 149.38. The individual county offices may not perform the duties assigned to the records commission themselves because the records commission is the only entity—absent a transfer of duties under R.C. 307.847—authorized to make rules for the retention and disposal of county public records with which county public offices are required to adhere and to review one-time disposal applications and records schedules of all county offices. R.C. 149.351(A); R.C. 149.38; *see Wagner v. Huron Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs.*, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-12-008, 2013-Ohio-3961, ¶17.

IV

Your final question asks whether the microfilming board has the authority to contract with the board of county commissioners to provide services. It does not: the microfilming board has neither the express nor implied authority to contract with its own board of county commissioners, so it “is without authority to enter into a contract such as here concerned”. *See* 1960 Op. Att’y

Gen. No. 1407, p. 359, 362, citing 14 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), page 238.

A

First, there is no express authority for the microfilming board to contract with its board of county commissioners to provide services. R.C. 307.806 states:

The county microfilming board may enter into a contract with the legislative authorities of any municipal corporation, township, port authority, water or sewer district, school district, library district, county law library association, health district, park district, soil and water conservation district, conservancy district, other taxing district, regional council established pursuant to Chapter 167. of the Revised Code, or otherwise, county land reutilization corporation organized under Chapter 1724. of the Revised Code, *or with the board of county commissioners or the microfilming board of any other county*, or with any other federal or state governmental agency, and such authorities may enter into contracts with the county microfilming board, to provide microfilming or image processing services to any of them.

(Emphasis added).

Following “ordinary grammar rules, items in a series are normally separated by commas.” *Village of W. Jefferson v. Cammelleri*, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2014-04-012, 2015-Ohio-2463, ¶15, citing *Chicago Manual of Style* 312 (16th Ed.2010); R.C. 1.42; accord Scalia & Garner, *Reading Law*, §23, 161 (2012) (“Punctuation is a permissible indicator of meaning”). And “[w]hen a comma separates phrases, the words within the commas are one item.” *Steiner v. Morrison*, 2016-Ohio-4798, 68 N.E.3d 151, ¶22 (7th Dist.).

Commas are used in R.C. 307.806 to separate each entity with which the microfilming board may contract. The phrase “or with the board of county commissioners or the microfilming board of any other county” is not divided by a comma, which means that it is one item. See, e.g., *McAuley v. Brooker*, 2017-Ohio-9222, 101 N.E.3d 1118, ¶52 (7th Dist.) (Waite, J., dissenting). Thus, the modifier “of any other county” in R.C. 307.806 refers both to “the microfilming board” and to “the board of county commissioners.” If the General Assembly had intended for the board of county commissioners to be a separate entity in the list provided—not modified by the phrase “of another county”—it could have included a comma between “board of county commissioners” and “the microfilming board of another county.” See, e.g., *Cammelleri*, at ¶18 (“If the village desires a different reading, it should amend the

ordinance and insert a comma between the phrase ‘motor vehicle’ and the word ‘camper’). But it did not, so it is not.

Additionally, “[i]n accordance with the maxim *noscitur a sociis*, the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; and again, according to a similar rule, the coupling of words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense.” *Myers v. Seabarger*, 45 Ohio St. 232, 236, 12 N.E. 796 (1887); *see also* R.C. 1.47(C) (“In enacting a statute, it is presumed that ... [a] just and reasonable result is intended”). For purposes of R.C. 307.80-.806, “county office’ means any officer, department, board, commission, agency, court, or other office of the county and the court of common pleas.” R.C. 307.80. Clearly, the board of county commissioners is a “county office” since it “exercises the corporate powers of a county, and, for all financial and ministerial purposes, is the county.” *Dall v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bldg. Comm.*, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 209, 24 Ohio Dec. 9, 11, 1913 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 30 (C.P.1913).

Conversely, the entities listed in R.C. 307.806 are not, by definition, the “county offices” for which the micro-filming board is required to provide services, so they need contracts to obtain said services. R.C. 307.80; *see, e.g.*, 1996 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 96-052, at 2-202 (a soil and water conservation district is not a “county office” for purposes of the ADP); 1993 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 93-050,

at 2-243 (entities not organized or supervised by the county are not county offices/boards); 1997 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 97-029, at 2-174 (a general health district is not a county office subject to the ADP). It follows that the board of county commissioners referenced in R.C. 307.806 must be one from another county, because otherwise it would be the only “county office,” as contemplated in R.C. Chapter 307, contained in the list.

To conclude, R.C. 307.806 expressly permits the microfilming board to contract for services with a board of county commissioners of “any other county,” but not with the board of county commissioners of its own county. 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 90-057, at 2-244.

I must further note that R.C. 307.15(A)(1) lists the specific entities with which the board of county commissioners may contract for certain services and functions. The microfilming board is not included, so the board of county commissioners similarly lacks express authority to contract with the microfilming board.

B

There is also no implicit authority for the microfilming board to contract with the board of county commissioners because it is required to provide its services to the board of commissioners.

The Board “*shall* coordinate the use of all microfilming or image processing equipment, software, or services in use throughout the *county offices* at the time the board is established.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 307.802. “The use of the word ‘shall’ within a statutory provision is generally understood as imposing a mandatory duty with respect to the conduct or functions therein described.” 1990 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 90-034, at 2-135, citing *State ex rel. City of Niles v. Bernard*, 53 Ohio St.2d 31, 34, 372 N.E.2d 339, 341 (1978). As stated above, the board of county commissioners is a county office.

Thus, once established, because the statute mandates the microfilming board to provide the board of county commissioners—a county office—with services, no contract is needed. *Compare* 2013 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2013-019, at 2-199 (“entering into a contract ... requires the exercise of discretion or judgment”).

In fact, with a microfilming board in existence, a county office may not contract on its own for any microfilming or image processing services or equipment unless the microfilming board determines that “such action is desirable.” R.C. 307.802. Even so, the plain language of this section does not authorize the county office to contract *with the microfilming board* of its own county because, as explained, the duties that the board owes to the county offices are

statutorily required and there is no need for a contract.

*

Consequently, there is neither implied nor express authority for the microfilming board to contract with any county office, including the board of county commissioners.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is my opinion, and you are hereby advised that:

1. The duties of the county records commission cannot be delegated to the board of county commissioners because they require the exercise of discretionary judgment, and there is no statutory authorization to do so.
2. The duties of the county microfilming board cannot be delegated to the board of county commissioners because they require the exercise of discretionary judgment, and there is no statutory authorization to do so.
3. The duties of the county recorder, acting as chief administrator of the county microfilming board, cannot be delegated by either the county recorder or the county microfilming board to the board of county

commissioners because they require the exercise of discretionary judgment, and there is no statutory authorization for either entity to do so.

4. Because the duties of the county records commission and the county microfilming board cannot be delegated, they may be transferred only pursuant to the procedure outlined in R.C. 307.847.
5. There is no explicit or implicit authority in the Revised Code for the county microfilming board to contract for services with its own county's board of county commissioners; instead, the county microfilming board is statutorily required to provide these services to the board of county commissioners.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Dave Yost". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "D" and a long, sweeping tail.

DAVE YOST
Ohio Attorney General